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INTRODUCTION
In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme
(LICRA),' a U.S. district court declared unenforceable a French judg-
ment against a California-based company that displayed Nazi
memorabilia on the Internet in violation of French law. The case pro-
vides an early illustration of the issues that arise when plaintiffs attempt
to enforce foreign judgments based on Internet-mediated harms.2 In par-
ticular, Yahoo! raises the question whether such judgments should be
enforced in the United States if they are based on foreign laws that re-
strict speech-a question of increasing importance as the Internet lowers
the cost of interacting with foreigners, and thus raises the stakes for do-
mestic enforcement of foreign judgments.
t © 2003 by Molly Shaffer Van Houweling. This work is licensed under the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License. To view a copy of this license, visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/1.0/ or send a letter to Creative Commons, 559
Nathan Abbott Way, Stanford, California 94305, USA.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. J.D., Harvard Law
School, 1998; B.A., University of Michigan, 1994.
This Article was originally prepared as a panel presentation to the Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools Section on Conflict of Laws. Thanks to the participants in that session, to
Section Chair Mathias W. Reimann, and to Kenneth Bamberger, Omri Ben-Shahar, Don
Herzog, Nina Mendelson, Mark Rosen, and Jonathan Zittrain for their feedback.
1. 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
2. In Yahoo!, the plaintiffs did not seek to have the French judgment enforced in the
United States. Yahoo! launched a preemptive strike by asking the district court to declare the
judgment unenforceable. See id. at 1186. The substantive issues are the same regardless of the
procedural posture.
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The Yahoo! court, following analysis in the few prior cases consider-
ing the enforcement of speech-restrictive foreign judgments, makes this
question look easy: of course U.S. courts should not enforce speech-
restrictive foreign judgments that could not be promulgated here. Few
commentators have objected to the Yahoo! court's conclusion. But the
cases on which the Yahoo! court confidently relies have received harsh
criticism, and with good reason. My own complaints are that these cases
ignore constitutionally significant differences between promulgation of
speech-restrictive rules and mere enforcement of them; and that the
cases fail to explain why speech directed abroad necessarily deserves
First Amendment protection. This Article will expand on this critical
view and extend the criticism to Yahoo!.
Although the Yahoo! court oversimplified the enforceability analysis,
there may in fact be serious First Amendment problems with enforcing
this type of speech-restrictive foreign judgment, especially in the context
of Internet speech. First, enforcement may chill legal speech to a U.S.
audience if the technology for identifying the location of Internet users is
ineffective or expensive. Second, and of more enduring concern, en-
forcement may chill even legal speech to a foreign audience as U.S.
speakers forgo speech directed abroad in order to avoid the expense of
complying with inconsistent foreign laws. This Article attempts to sup-
ply the justification-missing from Yahoo! and its predecessors, and
disputed in the commentary and case law-for applying the First
Amendment to this transborder speech.
The Article begins with a review of the relevant rules governing
enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. Part II explains
how courts have unpersuasively applied these rules when refusing to
enforce foreign libel judgments. Part III then explains how the Yahoo!
court adopted much of this faulty reasoning. Finally, Part IV explains the
considerations that better justify judicial refusal to enforce speech-
restrictive foreign judgments, especially those triggered by Internet
speech. The Article concludes that the prospect that U.S. Internet
speakers will choose to speak only to a U.S. audience-even when their
speech would be legal everywhere-is the most serious problem with
enforcing speech-restrictive foreign judgments triggered by Internet
speech.
I. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN U.S. COURTS
A civil money judgment cannot be enforced in a foreign country if
the defendant has no assets there. If the defendant holds assets in the
United States, then the prevailing plaintiff might seek to have the judg-
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ment enforced here.' U.S. courts enforce these foreign judgments-most
of the time. The question of enforceability is treated as a question of
state law,4 and over thirty states have adopted versions of the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Act. It provides that a foreign money judg-
ment "that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered ... is
conclusive between the parties .... The foreign judgment is enforceable
in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to
full faith and credit."6 The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws and
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations are to similar effect
This general rule of enforceability is subject to various limitations. It
applies to civil money judgments, not to injunctions or penal judgments.8
Courts may not enforce if "the judgment was rendered under a system
which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible
with the requirements of due process of law,"9 or if the foreign court
lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction. 1 0
Courts also have discretion to refuse enforcement on the ground
(among others) that the cause of action or claim for relief on which the
judgment rests is "repugnant to the public policy of [the enforcing]
state."" Various judicial formulations of this "public policy exception"
reject enforcement where "the original claim is repugnant to fundamen-
tal notions of what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is
3. Before a foreign judgment can be enforced, it must be recognized. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS ch. 5, topic 2, introductory note (1971). I treat both recogni-
tion and enforcement as part of the enforcement process for simplicity here.
4. E.g., Ingersoll Milling Mach. Co. v. Granger, 833 F.2d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 1987);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487 cmt. c
(1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS].
5. See Nat'l Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. States' Laws, A Few Facts
About the Uniform Money Judgments Recognition Act, http://www.nccusl.org/nccuslU
uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufmjra.asp (last visited Mar. 12, 2003).
6. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITON ACT §§ 2, 3 (1962).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98; id. § 117 cmt c; RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481.
8. For purposes of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, "'foreign
judgment' means any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of
money, other than a judgment for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in
matrimonial or family matters." UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 1;
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 481 ("Judgments granting injunc-
tions, declaring rights or determining status, and judgments arising from attachments of
property, are not generally entitled to enforcement .... "); id. § 483 ("Courts in the United
States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the collection of taxes, fines,
or penalties rendered by the courts of other states."); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66,
123 (1825) (no enforcement of foreign penal judgments).
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sought,"'2 and where enforcement would "'tend[] clearly to injure the
public health, the public morals, the public confidence in the purity of
the administration of the law, or to undermine that sense of security for
individual rights, whether of personal liberty or of private property,
which any citizen ought to feel.' ",3
This public policy exception is rarely applied." Courts explain that a
mere difference between the foreign forum's laws or procedures and
those that would be followed in a U.S. court does not amount to the "re-
pugnance" necessary to trigger the exception." Beyond this high
threshold of repugnance, the exception has little clear content.
II. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Among the cases in which courts have struggled to define the con-
tours of the public policy exception are several where plaintiffs sought to
enforce foreign libel judgments. In two widely cited cases,' 6 U.S. courts
refused to enforce English libel judgments rendered according to proce-
dures inconsistent with N.Y Times v. Sullivan and its progeny. In
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.," a New York court refused
to enforce an English libel judgment against the operator of a New York
news wire service, declaring that "[t]he protection to free speech and the
press embodied in [the First Amendment] would be seriously jeopard-
ized by the entry of foreign libel judgments granted pursuant to
standards deemed appropriate in England but considered antithetical to
the protections afforded the press by the U.S. Constitution."'8 Similarly,
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 117 cmt. c.
13. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1971) (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1893)).
14. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The standard is
high, and infrequently met."); Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 931 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
("The standard for refusing to enforce judgments on public policy grounds is strict; defendants
are rarely able to block judgments on these grounds."); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of For-
eign Money-Judgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International
Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 275 (1991); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T.
Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudicatations: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1670 (1968); cf. Neporany v. Kir, 5 A.D.2d 438 (N.Y. App. Div. 1958)
(holding that a Canadian judgment for seduction and criminal conversation could be enforced
in New York although such causes of action had been abolished as contrary to the public pol-
icy of the state).
15. E.g., Ackerman, 788 F.2d at 842 ("[M]ere variance with local public policy is not
sufficient to decline enforcement."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 117 cmt. c; Brand, supra note 14, at 275 & n.86 (citing cases).
16. For commentary on the two cases, see sources cited infra note 21.
17. 154 Misc. 2d 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
18. Id. at 235.
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in Telnikoff v. Matusevich,'9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland declared
that an English libel judgment should not be enforced in Maryland be-
cause "[t]he principles governing defamation actions under English law
... are so contrary to Maryland defamation law, and to the policy of
freedom of the press underlying Maryland law."20
Bachchan and Telnikoff have been criticized for oversimplifying the
public policy analysis regarding speech-restrictive foreign judgments.2' I
see two key problems with the reasoning in these cases. First, the courts
seem incorrectly to assume that mere enforcement of a foreign speech-
restrictive judgment has the same First Amendment (and, thus, public
policy) implications as imposition of a speech-restrictive rule by a state
actor in the first instance (the "state actor animus" problem). Second, the
courts appear to apply First Amendment-inspired public policy analysis
regardless of where the speech at issue originated and where it was di-
rected-without explaining how speech directed abroad necessarily
implicates First Amendment interests (the "extraterritoriality" problem).
A. State Actor Animus
Should the speech-restrictive policies of English libel law be im-
puted to a U.S. court asked to enforce an English libel judgment?
Bachchan and Telnikoff suggest as much by insisting that enforcement
raises free speech concerns of the magnitude at issue in N.Y Times v.
Sullivan." But unlike imposition of libel liability based on overbroad
19. 702 A.2d 230 (Md. 1997).
20. Id. at 249.
21. See, e.g., id. at 255-58 (Chasanow, J., dissenting); EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 24.45, at 1211 n.12 (3d ed. 2000) (describing the results in the cases as
"questionable"); Derek Devgun, United States Enforcement of English Defamation Judg-
ments: Exporting the First Amendment?, 23 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 195, 203 (1994) (describing
the reasoning in Bachchan as troublesome); Craig A. Stem, Foreign Judgments and the Free-
dom of Speech: Look Who's Talking, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 999, 1033-34 (1994) (criticizing
Bachchan because "the policies of the freedom of speech indicate that neither the United
States nor New York has an interest in applying the Free Speech Clause to Bachchan, while
England apparently does have an interest in applying its law of defamation"); Joachim Zekoll,
The Role and Status of American Law in the Hague Judgments Convention Project, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 1283, 1305-06 (1998) (describing Bachchan as "disappointing" because "[r]ather than
treating public policy as an instrument of last resort, the court required, in essence, that the
foreign court emulate every detail of American constitutional jurisprudence, including recent
shifts towards new rules."); see also Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity and Self-
Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1978, 1995-96 (1994) (criticizing the reasoning in Bachchan while praising the result); Jeff
Sanders, Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment to Defamation Claims
Against American Media, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 515, 552 (1994) (similar). But see
Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run Around U.S.
Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 256-62 (1994) (citing praise of Bachchan).
22. It is not entirely clear whether the Bachchan holding is based on the First Amend-
ment or on a subconstitutional public policy problem. In either event, the decision is clearly
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state law, enforcement of a speech-restrictive foreign judgment does not
necessarily involve animus toward-or at least targeting of-speech by
any state actor bound by the First Amendment.
Courts routinely enforce speech-restrictive judgments where the
source of the speech-limiting rule is something other than state or federal
law-where, for example, speech is limited by a private contract in
which the defendant has promised not to speak. Contract law is law, of
course, and judicial enforcement of a speech-restrictive contract is state
action that has the effect of restricting speech. 23 But courts typically view
contract law as generally applicable law with a merely incidental impact
on speech, subject to little if any First Amendment scrutiny. Courts do
not impute any content-based, censorial motives of the contract drafter to
the state. The Supreme Court held in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. that
even when a court goes beyond the four corners of a contract and enter-
tains a promissory estoppel claim, judicial enforcement of the promise
does not trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny.
25
based on the court's apprehension of problems akin to those raised by the N.Y 7imes v. Sulli-
van line of cases. See Bachchan, 154 Misc. 2d at 232-35. In Telnikoff the Maryland court
explicitly based its decision upon Maryland "public policy concerning freedom of the press
and defamation actions," and not directly upon the state or federal constitution. Telnikoff, 702
A.2d at 239. But the court then turned to the First Amendment and the Maryland constitution
to determine the content of the state's public policy. Id. at 240-51 (describing history of First
Amendment and Maryland constitutional protection of free speech and applying policies
drawn from that history).
23. See generally Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) ("[T]he application
of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms
constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment."); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CHOICES 259 (1985) ("The problem is not seeing that state courts are state actors-
that, surely, is obvious."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 29 (1959) ("That the action of the state court is action of the state ... is,
of course, entirely obvious."). But see State v. Noah, 9 P.3d 858, 870-71 (Wash. Ct. App.
2000) (distinguishing Cohen and concluding that enforcement of a settlement agreement,
unlike the application of state promissory estoppel law in Cohen, does not constitute state
action).
24. When state action regulates speech more directly, however, courts reject the argu-
ment that the regulation is content neutral because it is triggered by offense to a non-state
actor. See, e.g., Forsyth City v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992)
(invalidating a county ordinance that based permit fees on "the amount of hostility likely to be
created by the speech based on its content"); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989)
(holding that a flag-burning statute triggered by the likelihood that observers would be of-
fended was not content neutral); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 315-29 (1988) (invalidating a
statutory provision prohibiting display of any sign within five hundred feet of a foreign em-
bassy if the sign tends to bring the foreign government into public "odium" or "disrepute"-
despite the government's argument that the provision was a content-neutral attempt to comply
with "our international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dig-
nity").
25. 501 U.S. at 669 ("[G]enerally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment
simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to
gather and report the news.").
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Courts could view the enforcement of foreign judgments, like
enforcement of contracts, as generally applicable, only incidentally
speech-burdening state action.26 Enforcement is not necessarily moti-
vated by government hostility toward, or even targeting of, speech. The
state actor's motivation could instead be something like "an interest
in fostering stability and unity in an international order in which many
aspects of life are not confined to any single jurisdiction" 27-an interest
that supports generally applicable rules of enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. In Cohen, application of similarly generally applicable contract
rules did not even trigger First Amendment scrutiny, much less violate
the First Amendment or "undermine that sense of security for individual
rights ... which any citizen ought to feel, 2 9 as the public policy
exception supposedly requires. Neither Bachchan nor Telnikoff explains
why enforcement of foreign judgments should be treated so differently.
Unlike the promissory estoppel rule at issue in Cohen, some generally applicable rules
with merely incidental effects on speech do trigger at least some First Amendment scrutiny.
See, e.g., Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560, 566 (1991); United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985). The Court appears
to have conceded confusion on this point. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640
(1994) (comparing Cohen with Barnes and observing that "the enforcement of a generally
applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment")
(emphasis added). See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the
Fall: The Case for Intermediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 925, 939-42, 942 n.80
(1998) (noting tension and suggesting that intermediate scrutiny should have applied in
Cohen); Srikanth Srinivasa, Incidental Restrictions of Speech and the First Amendment, 12
CONST. COMMENT. 401 (1995) (attempting to reconcile incidental impact decisions). The
Bachchan and Telnikoff courts simply ignore the issue.
26. But see Eric P. Enson, Comment, A Roadblock on the Detour Around the First
Amendment: Is the Enforcement of English Libel Judgments in the United States Unconstitu-
tional?, 21 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 160 (1999) ("If state action is found in the
enforcement of English libel judgments, the First Amendment demands that each and every
state refuse to enforce these judgments."); Sarah Hudleston, Note, Preserving Free Speech in a
Global Courtroom: The Proposed Hague Convention and the First Amendment, 10 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 403, 427-28 (2001) (making the analogy to Cohen but rejecting it as insuffi-
ciently protective of speech).
27. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1604.
28. Elsewhere the Court has suggested that mere enforcement of another court's judg-
ment does not trigger the same procedural safeguards as issuance of the judgment in the first
instance. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 n.36 (1976) ("Once it has been determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction that the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would
seem to be no unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a State where the
defendant has property, whether or not that State would have jurisdiction to determine the
existence of the debt as an original matter.").
29. Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 E2d 435, 443 (3d Cir.
1971) (quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665, 666 (Pa. 1893)).
Spring 2003]
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B. Extraterritoriality
Even if enforcement of a foreign judgment involves no evident hos-
tility toward or targeting of speech on the part of a state actor subject to
the First Amendment, heightened First Amendment scrutiny could be
triggered by a significant negative effect on speech: ° But this possibility
merely highlights another shortcoming in Bachchan and Telnikoff. Both
cases involved liability for speech to a foreign audience, yet neither
opinion offers support for the controversial proposition that limiting
speech directed abroad is an effect that comes within the ambit of the
First Amendment.
In Bachchan, the speech at issue was a story about an international
scandal allegedly involving the plaintiff-an Indian national living in
Europe.' The defendant (the operator of a New York wire service) wired
the story to India, where it was picked up by newspapers distributed in
India and England.32 In refusing to enforce the British judgment against
the New York defendant, the Bachchan court explains that under British
libel law the plaintiff did not bear the burden of proving the falsity of the
defendant's story, and that:
[p]lacing the burden of proving truth upon media defendants
who publish speech of public concern has been held unconstitu-
tional because fear of liability may deter such speech. Because
such a "chilling" effect would be antithetical to the First
Amendment's protection of true speech on matters of public
concern, we believe that a private-figure plaintiff must bear the
burden of showing that the speech at issue is false before recov-
ering damages for defamation from a media defendant .... The
30. Some commentators focus on effect to argue that the Court refused to apply height-
ened scrutiny in Cohen because enforcement of the type of promise at issue there (a
newspaper's promise not to reveal the identity of a source) was likely to promote speech in the
long run by encouraging confidential informants to speak frankly to the media. E.g., Daniel A.
Farber, Free Speech Without Romance, 105 HARV. L. REV. 554, 575 (1991); The Supreme
Court, 1990 Term-Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 277, 280-86 (1991). But see generally
Frederick Schauer, Cuban Cigars, Cuban Books, and the Problem of Incidental Restrictions
on Communications, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 779, 780 (1985) ("[F]or me the focus of the
first amendment is on the motivations of the government."). Cohen by its terms only applies to
generally applicable rules with a "merely incidental" effect on speech. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at
669. So a substantial negative effect might take a rule outside of Cohen's coverage altogether.
But see Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705-07 (1986). Moreover, some generally
applicable rules with merely incidental effects on speech do trigger First Amendment scrutiny.
See supra note 25.
31. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ'ns, Inc., 154 Misc. 2d 228, 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1992).
32. The story was also reported in the defendant's New York newspaper, an edition of
which was printed and distributed in England by the defendant's English subsidiary. But a
separate judgment based on that publication was not at issue in Bachchan. Id. at 229-30.
[Vol. 24:697
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"chilling" effect is no different where liability results from en-
forcement in the United States of a foreign judgment obtained
where the burden of proving truth is upon media defendants. Ac-
cordingly, the failure of Bachchan to prove falsity in the High
Court of Justice in England makes his judgment unenforceable
here.33
The Bachchan court is concerned with the speech-restrictive effects
of enforcing the foreign judgment-in particular the indirect chilling of
lawful speech. But the court never explains exactly what speech will be
chilled. One possibility is that enforcement will chill speech by U.S.
speakers directed abroad. But it is not clear that the First Amendment
(and, hence, First Amendment-based public policy) protects speech di-
rected to a foreign audience. Some courts and commentators suggest that
it does not,34 and the Supreme Court has never settled the question."35 The
argument for nonprotection is typically that the First Amendment is con-
cerned foremost with promoting self-governance by the U.S. polity, and
that speech to foreigners does not contribute to American self-
governance.36 I will examine this proposition critically below; suffice it
to say for now that the Bachchan opinion does not grapple with it at all.
Perhaps the Bachchan court was concerned not only with the restric-
tion and chilling of speech directed to foreigners, but also with chilling
speech to a U.S. audience. The facts in Bachchan make this concern
33. Id. at 234.
34. E.g., Desai v. Hersh, 719 F. Supp. 670, 676 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[F]irst amendment
protections do not apply to all extraterritorial publications by persons under the protections of
the Constitution."); Devgun, supra note 21, at 203 (arguing that the reasoning in Bachchan is
troublesome because "there is no logical connexion between [the] decision to recognize the
judgment in New York and the possibility of chilling speech in any place that should be within
the court's proper concern"); Sharon E. Foster, Does the First Amendment Restrict Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Copyright Judgments and Arbitration Awards?, 10 PACE
INT'L L. REV. 361, 390 (1998) (questioning Bachchan on the ground that "[iut is difficult to
see how recognition of the English judgment would affect free speech in the United States,
which should be the focus of the court's concern"); Robert D. Kamenshine, Embargoes on
Exports of Ideas and Information: First Amendment Issues, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 863, 866
(1984-1985) ("[Wlhen scientific or technological information is communicated solely to a
foreign person, corporation, or government, the generally cited first amendment values have
little or no application."); Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo! and Democracy on the Internet, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 261, 267 (2002) ("The American [First Amendment] right does not apply to
the dissemination of web pages in France to French web users."); Maltby, supra note 21, at
2007 n.160 ("If the foreign audience has no constitutional right to hear the information, the
U.S. media have correspondingly little 'right' to publish abroad, since they derive no self-
fulfillment from the act, and in no way contribute to the enlightenment, truth seeking, or
self-government of the domestic audience.").
35. But cf Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (invalidating statute direct-
ing Post Office to inspect mailfrom foreigners).
36. See, e.g., Stem, supra note 21, at 1014-15, 1033; Maltby, supra note 21, at 2007
n. 160.
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relevant, as the defendant published the disputed story in its New York
newspaper as well as wiring it to India.3 7 U.S. speakers who reach a
global audience but who do not have the resources to tailor their
messages to many different jurisdictions might water down their domes-
tic publications to avoid speech-restrictive foreign judgments. Some
defenders of the result in Bachchan have focused on this domestic chill-
ing effect.38 But the Bachchan opinion does not allude specifically to the
prospect of chilling purely domestic speech, or give any indication of the
locus of the court's First Amendment concern.
In Telnikoff, the potential effects on speech were more clearly extra-
territorial. There, the disputed publication was an article written by one
British resident about another British resident.39 The speech at issue nei-
ther originated from, nor was sent to, the United States. 40 Again, the
court fails to explain how restricting this extraterritorial speech necessar-
ily violates the First Amendment or public policy.
Bachchan and Telnikoff, the two most prominent cases addressing
the question of the enforceability of speech-restrictive foreign judgments
in the United States, both strongly endorse the view that judgments
based on speech-restrictive rules that could not be promulgated by a U.S.
state actor cannot be enforced here. The courts fail to explain why the
censorial infirmities of foreign judgments must be imputed to enforcing
courts. Moreover, they fail to locate the speech-restrictive effects that
they purport to avoid and to address the argument that the First Amend-
ment does not operate vis-A-vis speech directed abroad.
III. YAHOO! V LICRA
In Yahoo! v. LICRA,4 ' a U.S. district court relied heavily on Bach-
chan in declaring unenforceable a French judgment triggered by
Yahoo!'s violation of a law against displaying Nazi memorabilia in
France.42 Few observers of the Yahoo! litigation have objected to the U.S.
court's holding,43 and the French litigants themselves have appealed only
37. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38. Maltby, supra note 21, at 2007-09; Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 259
(Md. 1997) (Chasanow, J., dissenting).
39. Telnikoff, 702 A.2d at 259 (Chasanow, J., dissenting). The libel defendant later
moved to Maryland, where the plaintiff sought enforcement against him. Id. at 232, 235 n.9.
40. It did, however, relate to a U.S. corporation (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty) for
which the plaintiff and defendant both worked. Id. at 232-33.
41. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
42. Id. at 1192-94.
43. In the most detailed analysis of the controversy to date, Joel Reidenberg defends the
French court's judgment without objecting to the U.S. court's refusal to enforce it. See Rei-
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the court's exercise of jurisdiction, not the substance of its declaration
that the French judgment is unenforceable." But, like Bachchan and Tel-
nikoff, the Yahoo! court makes the enforceability analysis look too easy.
Yahoo! is a Delaware corporation operating out of California." On
its flagship website, www.yahoo.com, the company provides various
Internet search tools, directories, other resources, and-most important
for present purposes-an online auction where Yahoo! users can post
descriptions and photos of items for sale.46 The auction site features a
variety of sporting goods, electronic equipment, antiques, and the like. It
also includes Nazi coins, stamps, and other relics of the Nazi era. These
Yahoo! auctions are viewable by Internet users in France, where exhibi-
tion of Nazi propaganda and artifacts is prohibited.48 In 2000, two French
non-profit organizations filed a civil suit in French court accusing Yahoo!
of violating that French law. 9
Yahoo! argued that the French court did not have jurisdiction over it
and that it would be impossible to avoid displaying Nazi memorabilia in
France without limiting Yahoo!'s offerings for all Internet users world-
wide. After receiving an expert report on the state of technology for
geographic filtering of Internet traffic, the French court ruled for the
plaintiffs, ordering Yahoo! to block French Internet users from viewing
the displays of Nazi memorabilia on www.yahoo.com or else face daily
fines for noncompliance.5
denberg, supra note 34. Jack Goldsmith uses the likelihood that U.S. courts will refuse to
enforce foreign judgments to quell alarm about expansive exercises of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion by foreign courts. Jack Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199,
1216-21 (1998) [hereinafter Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy]; Jack Goldsmith, Yahoo!
Brought to Earth, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 26, 2000, at 27, available at http://
news.ft.com/ft/gx.cgi/ftc?pagename=View&c=Article&cid=F3W85A41GC&liv%20e=true.
Some criticism of the Yahoo! decision is now emerging. Paul Schiff Berman, in his re-
cent comprehensive treatment of cyberspace jurisdiction, criticizes the U.S. court's
enforcement analysis as too facile. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 389 n.305, 519-21 (2002). Mark Rosen also criticizes Yahoo! in a
forthcoming article. See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution: The Grave Misconcep-
tion Concerning "Un-American" Foreign Judgments, 53 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2004)
(manuscript at 13-22, on file with author). My analysis differs from theirs in several respects.
See, e.g., infra notes 58, 62, 79.
44. Brief for Appellants at 2, Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (No. C-00-21275).
45. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
46. Yahoo! Shopping Auctions, at http://auctions.shopping.yahoo.com (last visited Feb.
15, 2003).
47. Id.
48. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1184.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1185.
51. Id.
Spring 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
Yahoo! responded by bringing an action against the French plaintiffs
in U.S. district court in California, seeking a declaration that the French
judgment was unenforceable in the United States (while claiming that it
had no assets against which the judgment could be enforced in France).52
Yahoo! presented several theories of unenforceability, including that
the French judgment was based on penal law and that enforcement
would be repugnant to U.S. and California public policy.5" After rejecting
the French organizations' various jurisdictional challenges, the district
court opinion focuses on the public policy exception, specifically on
First Amendment problems posed by the French judgment. The court
summarizes enforcement practice, noting that "United States courts gen-
erally recognize foreign judgments and decrees unless enforcement
would be prejudicial or contrary to the country's interests."54 It observes
that "the French order's content and viewpoint-based regulation of the
web pages and auction site on Yahoo.com ... clearly would be inconsis-
tent with the First Amendment if mandated by a court in the United
States.55 It then cites Bachchan for the proposition that enforcing a for-
eign judgment granted pursuant to standards contrary to U.S.
constitutional protections would jeopardize the protections embodied in
the First Amendment." With little additional analysis, the court declares
the French judgment unenforceable in the United States.
The Yahoo! opinion shares the shortcomings of Bachchan and Tel-
nikoff. First, the Yahoo! court overlooks the state actor animus problem.
The court stresses that "this Court may not enforce a foreign order that
violates the protections of the United States Constitution."57 The court
thus suggests that it would necessarily violate the First Amendment to
enforce a foreign judgment that would violate the First Amendment had
it been promulgated by a U.S. court. But a rule in favor of enforcing for-
eign judgments is not infused with state actor animus toward certain
speech the way a rule against displaying Nazi memorabilia is; enforcing
the French judgment against Yahoo! would require invoking only the
52. Complaint at 9, 12-13, Yahoo! (No. C-00-21275). But see Reidenberg, supra note
34, at 269 (identifying Yahoo! assets in France).
53. Complaint at 10-11, Yahoo! (No. C-00-21275). U.S. courts do not enforce foreign
penal judgments. See supra note 8. Although the French action was based on a provision in
the French criminal code, it took the form of a civil action brought by private parties to en-
force that provision. See Yahoo!, 169 F Supp. 2d at 1184 (describing the French judgment).
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations suggests that such a judgment should not be
classified as penal for purposes of the rule against enforcing penal judgments. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 483 cmt. b ("A penal judgment, for purposes of this sec-
tion, is a judgment in favor of a foreign state or one of its subdivisions ... .
54. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1193-94.
57. Id. at 1192.
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former rule, not the latter. Like Bachchan and Telnikoff, Yahoo! fails to
explain why employing a generally applicable rule of judgment en-
forcement necessarily poses a First Amendment and public policy
problem.
Unlike the Bachchan and Telnikoff courts, the Yahoo! court appears
to have considered the extraterritoriality issue; it repeatedly emphasizes
that its concern lies not with speech to foreigners, but rather with speech
"within our borders."59 The problem with Yahoo! on this score is that the
court does not convincingly explain how enforcing the judgment could
restrict or chill purely domestic speech.
The Yahoo! court alludes to a chilling effect on speech within the
United States: "[T]his Court may not enforce a foreign order that vio-
lates the protections of the United States Constitution by chilling
protected speech that occurs simultaneously within our borders."6 But
the mechanism of this purported chilling effect remains unclear. The dis-
trict court accepts, arguendo, the French court's finding that it is
technologically feasible for Yahoo! to identify and block French Internet
users from viewing the Nazi material while continuing to speak to a non-
French audience.6' On that assumption, the French order could be en-
forced without any effect on speech that is meaningfully "within our
borders."
Similarly unconvincing, if we take the French court's technological
conclusions at face value, is the argument pressed in an amicus brief be-
fore the Ninth Circuit:
Under the French court's theory, every individual or company
with a presence on the Internet would have to constantly monitor
the laws of every country in the world, search out content that
might be prohibited by one or more of those countries, and im-
plement some sort of blocking software that would screen
different categories of material from users in each particular
country.6
58. Mark Rosen, who is also analyzing Bachchan, Telnikoff, and Yahoo!, similarly
faults these courts for imputing the First Amendment shortcomings of foreign laws to the
enforcing courts. Rosen, supra note 43 (manuscript at 91-92). Unlike Rosen, I conclude be-
low that even without imputing foreign law to the enforcing court, the speech-restrictive
effects of enforcement may be severe enough to pose a First Amendment problem. Cf id. at
31.
59. Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1194.
62. Brief of Amicus Curiae Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. at 6,
Yahoo! (No. C-00-21275); see also Berman, supra note 43, at 386.
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An Internet speaker based in the United States could instead undertake
the less onerous task of monitoring the laws of the United States and
blocking all foreigners. The district court does not explain how this
alternative method of complying with foreign laws would chill speech
within the United States. Yet, like Bachchan and Telnikoff, it also fails to
explain how chilling speech to a foreign audience triggers First Amend-
ment concerns.
IV. NOTES FOR THE NEXT YAHOO!
Like its predecessors, the Yahoo! court fails to explain convincingly
why enforcing a speech-restrictive foreign judgment is repugnant to pub-
lic policy where any animus toward speech is expressed only by a non-
state actor, and where enforcement is unlikely to restrict or chill speech
within the United States. There are, however, several serious problems-
overlooked by the Yahoo! court-with enforcing speech-restrictive for-
eign judgments against Yahoo! and other Internet speakers.
First, there are reasons to be skeptical about the ability of geo-
graphic filtering technologies to keep illegal Internet speech from
reaching a regulating jurisdiction. The French court argued that Yahoo!
could feasibly use filtering technology in part because Yahoo! already
used such technology to determine where users were located for pur-
poses of displaying geographically and linguistically appropriate
advertisements.63 But the fact that filtering technology works reasonably
well for targeted advertising says little about its ability to prevent people
within certain jurisdictions from obtaining illicit materials. Users have
little incentive to circumvent technology that merely determines what
type of advertisements they will receive. Surely some Internet users will
object to being denied other types of speech that their governments want
to keep away from them.6' One of the experts who advised the French
court has since argued that even the measures he recommended could be
"trivially circumvented."65 Some language in the French opinion suggests
that Yahoo! would be held strictly liable for reasonable but imperfect
63. UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc., Ordonnance Rdffrd, T.G.I. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000,
available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis2000ll20.htm.
64. See Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Over-
the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users, at 7-8 (Sept. 2001) (expert memoran-
dum attached to National Association of Broadcasters submission to Industry Canada
regarding retransmission of commercial television content over the Internet), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/jump-091701.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2003).
65. See Ben Laurie, An Expert's Apology, available at http://www.apache-
ssl.org/apology.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2003).
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filtering.6 Therefore, one might conclude that enforcing the French
judgment would significantly chill speech within the United States be-
cause speakers would fear liability-triggering leakage into France.
Second, adverse effects on speech within our borders might arise if
geographic filtering technology was prohibitively expensive for some
Internet speakers. In its first cases addressing limitations on Internet
speech, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to impose expensive tech-
nology requirements on an otherwise relatively inexpensive speech
medium.67 Justice Kennedy recently expressed what appears to be a
66. "'We order the Company Yahoo! Inc. to take all necessary measures to dissuade
and render impossible any access via Yahoo.com to the Nazi artifact auction service ....'
Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185 (quoting French judgment) (emphasis added); see also
Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1329-31,
1329 n.239 (2002) (criticizing the French judgment for failing to adopt a reasonableness stan-
dard). But see Reidenberg, supra note 34, at 268 (interpreting the French judgment to apply
only a reasonableness standard).
67. In Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court invalidated provisions of
the Communications Decency Act (CDA) designed to protect minors from harmful material
on the Internet-in part because the technological safe harbors in the statute were either inef-
fective or "not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers." 521 U.S. 844, 881-
82 (1997). Elsewhere in the opinion the Court noted the Internet's potential to enable speech
by poorly-financed speakers:
[The Internet] provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication
of all kinds.... Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can
become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer.
Id. at 870; see also Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 E Supp. 824, 877 (Dalzell, J.)
(E.D. Pa. 1996).
Congress revised the invalidated provisions of the Communications Decency Act in the
form of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA). COPA was preliminarily enjoined by a U.S.
district court; the court of appeals affirmed on the ground that COPA applies a "community
standard" to gauge what material qualifies as "harmful to minors" although "material posted
on the Web is accessible by all Internet users worldwide," and "current technology does not
permit a Web publisher to restrict access to its site based on the geographic locale of each
particular Internet user." As the court explained:
COPA essentially requires that every Web publisher subject to the statute abide by
the most restrictive and conservative state's community standards in order to avoid
criminal liability. Thus, because the standard by which COPA gauges whether mate-
rial is "harmful to minors" is based on identifying "contemporary community
standards" the inability of Web publishers to restrict access to their Web sites based
on the geographic locale of the site visitor, in and of itself, imposes an impermissi-
ble burden on constitutionally protected First Amendment speech.
Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000). The Supreme Court
disagreed with the conclusion that application of a community standard necessarily violated
the First Amendment. But five justices expressed discomfort with the notion that Internet
speakers should be forced to develop or adopt technology to geographically locate their audi-
ence. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, observed that "it is easy and
cheap to reach a worldwide audience on the Internet, but expensive if not impossible to reach
Spring 2003]
Michigan Journal of International Law
prevailing view: Because "it is easy and cheap to reach a worldwide au-
dience on the Internet, but expensive if not impossible to reach a
geographic subset," Internet speakers should not be forced to adopt tech-
nology that keeps Internet speech that is legal in some places from
reaching places where it is illegal. 6' For Internet speakers who use the
Internet as an inexpensive speech medium but (unlike Yahoo!) cannot
afford to take advantage of geographic filtering technology, enforcement
of a foreign judgment requiring filtering might shut down the Internet
speaker altogether.69
The potential inadequacy and expense of geographic filtering tech-
nologies are two reasons why enforcement of a speech-restrictive foreign
judgment might chill Internet speech to a U.S. audience, triggering valid
First Amendment and public policy concerns. But these problems with
the technology and expense of geographic filtering may be temporary. 7
It therefore seems worth considering whether, assuming cheap and effec-
tive geographic filtering technology, enforcement of foreign judgments
against speakers like Yahoo! still poses First Amendment problems that
justify refusing domestic enforcement.
a geographic subset." Ashcroft v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 122 S.Ct. 1700, 1719 (2002)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 1714 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("I agree with Justice Kennedy that, given Internet
speakers' inability to control the geographic location of their audience, expecting them to bear
the burden of controlling the recipients of their speech ... may be entirely too much to ask,
and would potentially suppress an inordinate amount of expression."); id. at 1716 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("To read the statute as adopting the com-
munity standards of every locality in the United States would provide the most puritan of
communities with a heckler's Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation. The technical diffi-
culties associated with efforts to confine Internet material to particular geographic areas make
the problem particularly serious."); id. at 1724 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("COPA ... covers a
medium in which speech cannot be segregated to avoid communities where it is likely to be
considered harmful to minors. The Internet presents a unique forum for communication be-
cause information, once posted, is accessible everywhere on the network at once. The speaker
cannot control access based on the location of the listener, nor can it choose the pathways
through which its speech is transmitted."). Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, took the contrary view that "[i]f a publisher wishes for its material to be
judged only by the standards of particular communities, then it need only take the simple step
of utilizing a medium that enables it to target the release of its material into those communi-
ties." Id. at 1712 (Thomas, J.). Cf Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
125-26 (1989); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 106 (1974).
68. Ashcroft, 122 S.Ct. at 1719 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
supra note 67.
69. See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 193
(1999) (arguing that traditional conflict-of-laws rules do not necessarily work well "in a world
where anyone could be a multinational").
70. See id. at 207-08; Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 808-12 (2001); Goldsmith, Against
Cyberanarchy, supra note 43, at 1225-29.
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Even if geographic filtering worked effectively and inexpensively, as
it might someday, compliance with the French order would of course
burden Yahoo!'s speech to French recipients. As noted above, some
courts and commentators have suggested that the First Amendment does
not protect speech directed to a foreign audience,7 and the Supreme
Court has never clearly settled the question. Bachchan and Telnikoff were
therefore disappointing in their failure to address the issue. Still, some
case law and commentary suggests that the First Amendment does afford
protection to U.S. speakers targeting foreign listeners.72 This appears to
be the better view.
71. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Junger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000) (suggesting, without discus-
sion of extraterritoriality issue, that restrictions on export of encryption technology are subject
to First Amendment scrutiny); DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F2d
275, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (observing that "the right of Americans to maintain First Amend-
ment relationships with foreigners has been upheld in Lamont v. Postmaster General" but then
concluding that "the right of Americans to associate with nonresident aliens 'is not an abso-
lute'"); id. at 303 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The First
Amendment secures to persons in the United States the respect of our government for their
right to communicate and associate with foreign individuals and organizations, as well as with
individuals and organizations stateside."); Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 509 n.9
(9th Cir. 1988) (" '[Tihere can be no question that, in the absence of some overriding govern-
mental interest such as national security, the First Amendment protects communications with
foreign audiences to the same extent as communications within our borders.' ") (quoting and
affirming 646 F. Supp. 492, 502 (C.D. Cal. 1986)); Karn v. U.S. Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp.
1, 9-12 (D.D.C. 1996) (suggesting, without discussion of extraterritoriality issue, that restric-
tions on export of encryption technology are subject to First Amendment scrutiny); Pathfinder
Fund v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 746 E Supp. 192, 196 (D.D.C. 1990) ("[A] First Amendment
violation is not found if governmental action has merely made it somewhat more difficult for
domestic organizations to associate with the organizations of their choice .... If, however, it
'directly and substantially' interferes with plaintiffs' ability to associate with foreign NGO's,
then it is reviewed under a strict scrutiny standard."); see also Albert J. Rosenthal, Interna-
tional Population Policy and the Constitution, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 301, 313-19
(1987); Louis Henkin, The Constitution As Compact and As Conscience: Individual Rights
Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 34 (1985). Cf Lamont v. Postmaster
Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (invalidating statute directing Post Office to inspect mail from
foreigners). Despite these indications, First Amendment protection for speech to foreigners is
by no means well-established. See generally Burt Neuborne & Steven R. Shapiro, The Nylon
Curtain: America's National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV.
719, 745-46 (1985). Neuborne and Shapiro observe:
Federal courts on occasion, have been protective of first amendment values in cases
affecting the free flow of information across our national border. More typically,
however, national border cases have been regarded as sui generis by the federal
courts and, consequently, the doctrinal protections of the first amendment have not
been applied. The net result of the Court's ambivalence about classic first amend-
ment review in national border cases has been the gradual emergence of a degree of
censorship at the border that would not be tolerated in any other sphere of our na-
tional life.
Spring 20031
Michigan Journal of International Law
The First Amendment should protect speech to foreign audiences
even if the amendment is concerned primarily with domestic self-
government. 73 For one thing, speech to foreigners often indirectly im-
pacts U.S. policy discussions and U.S. policy making 4 More generally,
at least some speech has attributes of a network good. It is more valuable
when more people use it-more valuable for building communities, for
igniting illuminating debates, and for spreading ideas. Therefore, even a
First Amendment theory concerned only with speech's political value to
U.S. speakers and listeners should acknowledge that our domestic dia-
logue benefits when we have more people (from more places) in on the
conversation."
This First Amendment interest in speech to foreigners does not settle
the question of the enforceability of foreign speech-restricting judg-
ments. Perhaps the First Amendment interest in reaching a global
audience is outweighed by the (generally applicable) governmental in-
terest in maintaining neighborly relations by enforcing judgments
against activities, including speech, that do harm in other countries 7 6
do not intend here to settle that question, but merely to identify the First
Amendment interest in speech to foreigners that has not been articulated
clearly in cases like Bachchan, Telnikoff, and Yahoo!.
There is a concern that lingers even if we conclude that policies in
favor of enforcing foreign judgments outweigh a speaker's interest in
reaching a foreign audience with speech that is illegal in the foreign ju-
risdiction. Assuming that technology continues to improve, it may
become easier to withhold speech from foreign countries than to sort out
73. See generally Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The
right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social, physical, politi-
cal and other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning and substance to freedom
of expression and freedom of the press."); Neubome & Shapiro, supra note 72, at 765-76
(arguing for "a more extensive judicial role in protecting the flow of ideas across our national
border").
74. Cf Brad R. Roth, The First Amendment in the Foreign Affairs Realm: "Domesticat-
ing" the Restrictions on Citizen Participation, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 255, 284
(1993) ("[W]hen ... Jesse Jackson, by meeting with an officially-disfavored foreign leader,
cause[s] the foreign government to appear in a light that undermines support among Ameri-
cans for a U.S. policy of confrontation, he works to 'defeat the measures' (or machinations) of
U.S. policymakers in just the manner that constitutional democracy, by its essence, makes
available.").
75. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Expressive Commerce in Cyberspace: Public Goods,
Network Effects, and Free Speech, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 792 (2000) ("Humans are social
animals, and information may have more value when they share it. Being the only person in an
Internet discussion group is essentially valueless; only the participation of others makes the
activity worthwhile").
76. Cf supra note 25.
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inconsistent foreign laws that specify what counts as harmful where.7  At
that point, the private benefit speakers receive from choosing to reach a
global audience may not be worth the extra cost, in terms of legal re-
search and compliance, of speaking globally--even if the public benefits
from creating a global conversation exceed the costs.78 Internet speakers
may therefore react to enforcement of speech-restrictive foreign judg-
ments by using geographic filtering technology to send all of their
speech-harmful and harmless, illegal and legal, racist rants and reci-
pes-only to a U.S. audience. Limiting Internet speech to only U.S.
recipients could thus sacrifice not only the speech to foreigners that
would violate foreign laws, but also speech that would be perfectly legal
everywhere.79
The Yahoo! district court unconvincingly suggests that enforcing the
French court's judgment against Yahoo! would chill speech from Yahoo!
77. This concern will strike some as overblown because Internet speakers need not fear
liability everywhere--only where personal jurisdiction may properly be exercised based on
some intentional conduct by the speaker. See generally Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy,
supra note 43, at 1216-18; Reidenberg, supra note 34, at 276-77; Rosen, supra note 43
(manuscript at 91-92). But availability of geographic filtering technology may alter the juris-
dictional analysis such that failure to use technology to avoid reaching a jurisdiction counts as
intentional targeting. See Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber-Collision of Cultures: Who Regu-
lates?, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673, 687 (2003) (suggesting that if offensive speech is made
available in France despite the feasibility of limiting access in France, "it cannot be the result
of an accident").
78. See generally Farber, supra note 30, at 558-89. Farber observes:
[I]nformation, like clean air or national defense, has many of the attributes of a pub-
lic good. That is, the benefits of information cannot be restricted to direct
purchasers but inevitably spread to larger groups. The production of information of-
ten produces positive externalities-that is, benefits to third parties. Because the
producer does not consider these benefits in his production decision, less informa-
tion is produced than is socially optimal.
Id.
79. Because I am particularly worried about limiting even that speech that is legal in the
receiving jurisdiction, my emphasis is slightly different from Paul Berman's when he notes
that "[a] cyberspace where individuals could only access content that was approved by their
government would be a very different cyberspace from the one most people have experienced
so far." Berman, supra note 43, at 390-91.
One potential response to my concern is that if enforcement of judgments like that at is-
sue in Yahoo! has the effect of discouraging international transmission of even harmless
speech, then France and other regulating states will modify (and perhaps harmonize) their
laws in order to reassure foreign speakers and thus to preserve the benefits associated with
receiving foreign speech. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, Be Careful What You Ask For: Reconcil-
ing a Global Internet and Local Law 12-13 (Apr. 16, 2003) (unpublished manuscript,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractuid=395300). But there is no
reason to assume that regulating states will modify their laws in a way that takes full account
of the benefits to U.S. speakers, and the U.S. polity, of sending speech abroad: So I remain
concerned about the disincentive effects of enforcing judgments based on inconsistent foreign
laws.
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to U.S. recipients. That might be true if geographic filtering technology
was ineffective or prohibitively expensive, but the Yahoo! court made
neither of those findings, and problems with the technology are likely
temporary. The enduring problem with enforcing this type of judgment is
that it might encourage U.S. Internet speakers to communicate only with
U.S. audiences, sacrificing even legal communication with foreign audi-
ences-communication that is valuable here, and does no harm there.
This possible consequence of enforcing foreign judgments that restrict
Internet speech, an effect ignored by the Yahoo! court, strikes me as the
most repugnant feature of enforcing speech-restrictive foreign judgments
in the United States.80
CONCLUSION
The Internet, by providing a relatively inexpensive way to interact
with (and harm) people in faraway countries,8 ' increases the potential for
harm by, and judgments against, U.S. defendants who have no assets in
the foreign forum. The Internet thus raises the stakes for domestic en-
forcement of foreign judgments.82 As the stakes rise, so will the pressure
on the seldom-used and ill-defined public policy safety valve, and the
pressure on courts (or legislators, or international treaties) to define it.83
Yahoo! v. LICRA illustrates this phenomenon, but the court's analysis
adds little to the heretofore unsatisfying judicial analysis of the public
80. Nonenforcement need not mean that a foreign country's regulatory goals go unreal-
ized. As Horatia Muir Watt explains, the regulating state could bear the burden of employing
technology to block offensive speech in the absence of enforcement jurisdiction over the
speaker. Muir Watt, supra note 77, at 692-94; see also Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of
Control, 43 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=388860. If crudely implemented, such methods could limit even
more speech than the self-imposed balkanization that I fear would result from enforcement of
foreign judgments. This important question is a topic for future research.
81. See generally Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J.
1805 (1995). But cf Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV.
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policy exception in the context of speech-restrictive foreign judgments.
The question of enforceability is more difficult than Yahoo! and its
predecessors have made it look. Courts refusing to enforce foreign
speech-restrictive judgments should not assume that a judgment that
could not be imposed by a U.S. court in the first instance because it re-
flects state hostility toward speech should not be enforced here on First
Amendment grounds. Courts concerned with the chilling effects of for-
eign judgments imposed based on speech sent to foreigners need to
grapple with the difficult question of whether the First Amendment and
the policy concerns it represents operate with regard to speech to a for-
eign audience.
This Article has tried to describe how the Yahoo! court could have
improved on its predecessors' analysis. There are problems with geo-
graphic filtering technology that suggest that enforcement of speech-
restrictive foreign judgments could chill Internet speech directed to a
U.S. audience. There are even First Amendment concerns with foreign
judgments that chill legal speech to a foreign audience. This may be the
best reason to find enforcement of foreign speech-restrictive judgments
repugnant to courts concerned with preserving the benefits of the Inter-
net as an inexpensive, global forum for speech.
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